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Abstract
Between 1925 and 1935, several private firms capable of constructing warships, or parts
thereof, collapsed, merged or were partly or fully ‘sterilised’ against any return to ship-
building during a period of ‘rationalisation’ to reduce perceived overcapacity relative to
demand in British shipbuilding. Thereafter, rearmament had the opposite effect upon
industry; lack of capacity in some key areas created almost unprecedented demand,
and led eventually to uncontrolled price collusion and profits, particularly on warship
contracts. An investigation into profiteering was undertaken in 1943, which embar-
rassed the remaining builders and their principal contractors. This article establishes
that the Admiralty had allowed a form of price-fixing at taxpayers’ expense to proliferate
for some time, a largely unknown episode that spanned the years of disarmament and
rearmament. Further, it explains how and why collusion occurred when it did, and dis-
cusses the catalytic role of shipyard rationalisation. Finally, we conclude by suggesting
reasons for such loose Admiralty control of warship costs during rearmament.
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Introduction
Consequent upon the Naval Defence Act of 1899, and the adoption of a ‘two-power
standard’ by which the Royal Navy should match the naval strength of any two other
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countries, private shipbuilders constructed an increasing number of warships for the
Royal Navy.1 In the escalating naval race with Germany, from 1909 to 1913 private
firms launched 534,000 standard displacement tons (sdt) of warships for the domestic
account.2 Collectively, the major warship firms were mixed builders of warships and
merchant ships, including passenger liners,3 their market strategy based on the belief
that a downturn in mercantile construction could be counterbalanced by an upsurge
in demand for more profitable warship building, or vice versa. During the Great
War, with competitive tendering abandoned and replaced by allocation of orders by
the Admiralty, production became heavily skewed towards warship building.
Accordingly, warship firms won highly profitable ‘cost plus’ contracts, which encour-
aged wasteful practices.4
In the aftermath of war, the Royal Navy’s abandonment of the commitment to the
‘two-power standard’, treaty limitations, deflationary policies, economic nationalism
elsewhere, and continuing austerity meant that large numbers of private shipbuilders
engaged in warship work before and during the war were competing for a vastly
reduced programme of naval construction. The impact of the Washington Naval Treaty
of 1921 was immediate in that four battlecruiser orders were cancelled.5 In 1922–
1923, the value of warship construction work for the Admiralty plummeted from
£11,816,000 to £721,000,6 a situation not aided by a concomitant downturn in mercantile
1. H. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde: Naval Orders and the Prosperity of the Clyde
Shipbuilding Industry, 1889-1939 (Edinburgh, 1987), 30. The immediate consequence of
the Naval Defence Act was that private shipbuilders were awarded contracts in a five-year
programme to build four battleships, five protected cruisers, 17 second-class cruisers, and
six torpedo gun boats.
2. A. Slaven, British Shipbuilding: A history, 1500–2010 (Lancaster, 2013), 63. Standard dis-
placement tons is a measure of the weight of water a ship displaces when fully manned
and equipped, including stores and ammunition, but excluding fuel and reserve feed water.
The National Archives (hereafter TNA), Kew, London, UK, DNC Department Admiralty
Records of Warship Construction During the War, 1914–1918. Peebles, Warshipbuilding
on the Clyde, 74. In the distribution of Admiralty orders for warships from 1909 to 1914,
Clyde firms were dominant and were contracted to build 77 ships of 325,606 sdt. Unless
otherwise stated, subsequent tonnage figures are taken from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping
Annual Summaries.
3. TNA, CAB 102/538, L. Errington, Table of warship construction 1909–1913, divided by gov-
ernment and private yards.
4. For British shipbuilding in this period, see H. Murphy, ‘The British Shipbuilding Industry
during the Great War: A Contextual Overview Incorporating Standardization and the
National Shipyards, 1916–1920’, International Journal of Maritime History, 14 (2012),
19–63. Cost-plus contract paid the shipbuilder’s costs of production plus a profit, with no
attempt to reach a fixed price prior to, or during, production, or to limit the total amount of
payment.
5. For this period, see, G. H. Bennett, The Royal Navy in the Age of Austerity: Naval and
Foreign Policy under Lloyd George (London, 2016), chapter 7.
6. L. Johnman and H. Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918: A Political
Economy of Decline (Liverpool, 2002), 19.
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demand when freight rates collapsed in 1920, leading to wage reductions and widespread
unemployment in shipbuilding districts.7
Against this background, only 18,000 sdt of warships were launched in private yards
during 1920, with no warships built by them over the next four years. This left the mixed
builders in a severe bind as all had invested in expensive plant and equipment carrying
huge overhead costs, which were now largely under-utilised. On the mercantile side,
the industry had at least a temporary increase in demand through the passage of Trade
Facilities legislation, which guaranteed loans to shipowners to order in UK shipyards,
though the positive effects were limited.8
Although it was in the Admiralty’s interest to keep the private warship and engine
building firms in business, both for competitive tendering purposes and to preserve,
for strategic reasons, as many firms as possible capable of building the most complex
warships, such firms faced the twin forces of economic downturn and disarmament. In
this especially perilous situation they were the first to ‘seek shelter’ from the gathering
storm. Yet, despite the obvious perils and amidst myriad histories of interwar Britain, dis-
armament and rearmament, only scant attention has been paid to how the shipbuilding
industry reacted to and dealt with such forces, and the effects of these upon the
Admiralty (and thus Britain’s) strategic interests. This article explains the process of
‘seeking shelter’, which led to sophisticated collusion between notionally competing
firms, and demonstrates how and why it was allowed to evolve, and with what conse-
quences (or indeed benefits). What follows is a chronological overview of price fixing
for Admiralty contracts by private shipbuilders, the effects of 1930s rationalisation
schemes, and the belated, though largely ineffectual, attempts at Admiralty oversight
and scrutiny in light of clear evidence of profiteering prior to and during the Second
World War.
Warship builders’ committee
The history of price fixing can be dated to tentative discussions in late 1925, which
followed the collapse of small-scale Admiralty assistance schemes to builders (in
7. L. Johnman and H. Murphy, ‘An Overview of the Economic and Social Effects of the
Interwar Depression on Clydeside Shipbuilding Communities’, International Journal of
Maritime History, 18 (2006), 231–2. In March 1921, the 29 shipbuilding firms on the
Clyde employed 42,209 skilled men and apprentices. By 1923, employment had fallen by
51 per cent. That year, if labourers are included, 32,000 shipbuilding workers were
unemployed on Clydeside.
8. L. Johnman and H. Murphy, ‘Subsidy and Treasury: The Trade Facilities Act and the UK
Shipbuilding Industry in the 1920s’, Contemporary British History, 22 (2008), 95, 102.
The function of the Trade Facilities Act, which ran from November 1921 and was renewed
annually until it ended in 1927, was to stimulate employment. The Act authorised the
Treasury to guarantee the payment of interest and principal on loans to be applied for by ship-
owners. The aggregate capital guaranteed was not to exceed £25m. By May 1927, this figure
had increased to £75m. Shipbuilding was the largest beneficiary of the Act and total guaran-
tees to the industry amounted to £21,640,585, 29 per cent of the total. See also L. Jones,
Shipbuilding in Britain: Mainly between the Two World Wars (Cardiff, 1957), 143–5.
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the form of armour subsidies) and of firms themselves – the Coventry Ordnance
Works being a notable casualty in that year.9 in February 1926, at the Hotel Cecil
in London, 15 private firms decided that co-operation was better than closure and a
decision was taken to form a committee.10 In that year, the last and only two battle-
ships to be built before the rearmament period, HMS Nelson and HMS Rodney, were
completed (at a loss) at Cammell Laird in Birkenhead and at Armstrong Whitworth on
Tyneside, respectively.11 At first, an unofficial destroyer rota was agreed between
member firms, which would last until 1929. Each member firm was allocated a pos-
ition in the rota by drawing lots, and a tendering price was agreed with a small
level of profit. This allowed a more even spread of destroyer orders (which were
not limited by Treaty obligations) among the member firms and avoided cutthroat
competition.12
Whether the Admiralty knew, or had suspicions, of the group’s existence in 1926
remains contentious.13 No official investigation was undertaken to confirm or deny
that a committee had been formed, while records are sparse, which was perhaps the inten-
tion all along as the group’s deliberations were kept secret from the rest of the industry.14
Such was the level of secrecy that member firms were given codenames.15 As a com-
parator, the Admiralty could use its experience of previous contracts, prices and
building times in the government-controlled Royal Dockyards, which had historic-
ally built destroyers, submarines and capital ships, to question profit rates in the
9. A. Slaven, ‘A Shipyard in Depression. John Brown’s of Clydebank, 1919–1938’, Business
History, 19 (1990), 200.
10. These were Clyde: Wm. Beardmore (Dalmuir), John Brown (Clydebank), Wm. Denny
(Dumbarton), Fairfield (Govan), Scott (Greenock), Alexander Stephen (Linthouse),
Yarrow, (Scotstoun). Tyne: Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth (Elswick and Walker on
Tyne), Hawthorn Leslie (Hebburn), Palmers (Amble, Hebburn and Jarrow), Swan Hunter
and Wigham Richardson (Wallsend). Elsewhere: Cammell Laird (Birkenhead), J. Samuel
White (East Cowes, Isle of Wight), J. Thornycroft, (Woolston-Southampton), Vickers
(Barrow in Furness).
11. British Parliamentary Papers (hereafter BPP) 1942–43, vol. 2, Public Accounts Committee
(PAC) Navy Appropriation Account (1943), q.3244–3245.
12. Scottish Business Archive (hereafter SBA), University of Glasgow, Papers of Scott’s
Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd of Greenock; SBA, GD319/12/7/6, Meeting at
Hotel Cecil. Hull and Machinery for Admiralty Contracts, 19 December 1926. Also cited
in C. W. Miller, Planning and Profits: British Naval Armaments and the Military
Industrial Complex, 1918-1941 (Liverpool, 2018), 52.
13. Slaven, ‘A Shipyard in Depression’, 200, states that the rota was done with Admiralty assist-
ance. Peebles,Warshipbuilding on the Clyde, 111, cites Slaven on this point. L. Johnman and
H. Murphy, ‘Welding and the Shipbuilding Industry: AMajor Constraint?’ in R. Harding, ed.,
The Royal Navy, 1930-2000 (London, 2005), 101. Note that the existence of the committee
was kept secret until February 1935, when it was officially disclosed.
14. What remains of the Warship Group records of this period can be found in fire-damaged
records of Scott’s Shipbuilding and Engineering Co., Ltd., papers in the GD319 classification:
SBA, GD319/12/7/5-7. Scott’s shipyard was bombed by the Luftwaffe in May 1941 and
many records were destroyed.
15. SBA, GD319 12/7/7, Shipbuilder Codenames. Secret.
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private yards. As the main function of the Royal Dockyards was repair and ser-
vicing, this was hardly ideal, as overhead and thus construction costs were typically
far higher than in the private yards. It was also against a small, or at best, out of date
sample size. Between 1936 and 1939, for example, the only warships built in the
Royal Dockyards were cruisers, sloops and submarines, and no battleships had
been built since 1918.16 Moreover, the Admiralty’s often substantial design
changes in warships under construction in private yards were commonplace as
rearmament progressed and often had significant cost implications. The net result
was that making comparisons – even if so desired – was at least elastic, and at
worst very difficult.
Regardless of knowledge or suspicion, what is not in question is that the committee
became a secretive cartel, or in the argot of the period, a price fixing ‘ring’.17 By
1927, one member, the Tyne shipbuilder, Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth, had been
brought down by an unwise investment in a Newfoundland paper mill, and with Bank
of England assistance – the Bank reputedly lost £5m in debentures and nearly
£500,000 in interest payments – it was merged with Vickers of Barrow-in-Furness as
Vickers-Armstrong, with Vickers holding two thirds of the equity.18
Thereafter, the Warship Group, after the formation of the industry’s trade association,
the Shipbuilding Conference, in 1928, was intimately entwined with measures to limit the
industry’s capacity to bring it into line with anticipated demand, thereby improving
overall profitability. This reached its apogee with the formation, with Bank of England
assistance, of the industry’s rationalisation vehicle, National Shipbuilders Security Ltd
(NSS), in 1930. The objects of NSS were to assist the industry by purchasing redundant
as well as obsolete shipyards, dismantling and disposal of their contents and the resale of
sites under restriction (through covenants) against any further use for shipbuilding
(sterilisation).19
Dark years: The National Shipbuilders’ Security scheme and its
effects
NSS’s first purchase was Wm. Beardmore’s giant Dalmuir Naval Construction Yard,
slated for closure in September 1930, for £209,000. The Bank of England had earlier
16. TNA, CAB 102/535, L. Errington, Naval New Construction Requirements, 1934–1939.
17. C. W. Miller, ‘British Naval Armaments, Cartels and Defence Planning Between the World
Wars’, Enterprise et Histoire, 85 (2016), 70–87.
18. The Bank of England was intimately involved in industrial rationalisation in the interwar
period. Its two rationalisation vehicles, Securities Management Trust Ltd, formed in
November 1929, and Bankers Industrial Development Company Ltd, formed in April
1930, were active in industrial reorganisation measures, through mergers. The figure of
£5m is cited in A. F. Lucas, ‘The Bankers Industrial Development Company’, Harvard
Business Review, 11 (1930), 270–9.
19. NSS Memorandum of Association, 1930. For the NSS, see A. Slaven, ‘Self Liquidation: The
National Shipbuilders Security Company and British Shipbuilders in the 1930s’, in S. Palmer
and G. Williams, eds., Charted and Uncharted Waters: Proceedings of a Conference on the
Study of Maritime History (Greenwich, 1982), 125–41.
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assisted in the restructuring of the Beardmore enterprises.20 In a yard expressly built for
warship construction, Beardmore had launched four battleships, seven cruisers, 21
destroyers, 13 submarines, six hospital ships and a seaplane carrier between 1906
and 1919. In the following decade, Beardmore had only built one cruiser and two
submarines.21 As one Warship Group member departed, a new member, another
mixed builder, Harland & Wolff of Belfast and the Clyde, took its place in
November, but not before being told to exercise discretion and absolute secrecy.22
By 1930, the industry as a whole had experienced a reduction of approximately
40 per cent in demand compared to 1913, with capacity increased by 20 per cent.
Indeed, the all-time record launching figures of 2 million gross tons in 1920 was
never again surpassed. Many mercantile-only yards had experienced very low
volumes of work and suffered from a lack of investment. Tonnage under construc-
tion in 1929 reached 1,600,000 gross tons, yet half of available berths remained
unoccupied. For most of the 1920s the industry operated at one-third of its capacity.
Illustrating the issues facing builders, at the nadir of the industry’s fortunes from
1930 to 1933 many yards closed altogether until demand picked up again. Some
form of rationalisation was clearly necessary and urgent. Indeed, many yards
closed for months or years, the record closure being Charles Connell’s Scotstoun
shipyard (non-Warship Group), which stayed closed for eight years from 1930.
On the River Wear, average closures in mercantile-only firms lasted five years.
Cammell Laird, a Warship Group member firm, closed from 1932 to 1934 and reo-
pened when the Admiralty ordered a cruiser and two destroyers.23 Another group
member, Fairfield, was technically insolvent by June 1935 due to the collapse
into receivership of a major passenger liner customer, Anchor Line, and was
rescued by the Port Glasgow mercantile builder, and Chairman of NSS, Sir
James Lithgow.24
NSS actions, under Lithgow’s chairmanship, removed upwards of a third of the indus-
try’s capacity by 1938, mostly in the mercantile sector. This could be termed faux ration-
alisation, however, as it could hardly be seen as making the industry more efficient. Yet
the elimination of excess competition meant that the volume of work in progress averaged
around 50 per cent greater than had been shared among the original firms.25 It is perhaps a
20. Miller, Planning and Profits, 73–4. For Beardmore, see I. Johnstone, Beardmore Built: The
Rise and Fall of a Clydeside Shipyard (Clydebank, 1993), and for Beardmore’s other indus-
trial sectors, see J. R. Hume and M. S. Moss, Beardmore: The History of a Scottish Industrial
Giant (London, 1979).
21. Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State, 36.
22. SBA, GD319/12/7/6, Memo from Crease to Brown, 29 October 1930. Also cited in Miller,
Planning and Profits, 56.
23. Johnman and Murphy, ‘An Overview of the Economic and Social Effects’, 246.
24. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde, 142–3.
25. Royal Museums Greenwich, National Maritime Museum, Caird Library, Shipbuilders and
Repairers National Association Papers (hereafter NMM, SRNA), SRNA 4, Shipbuilding
Conference General Meeting Reports, Minutes of AGM, 4 November 1937.
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moot point, but had the NSS not existed it is more than likely, given the dire prospects of
the industry as demand plummeted (a trend which was not meaningfully reversed until
the second half of the 1930s), that many of the closures would have taken place in any
event.
Illustrating this point, in the Warship Group the dismantling of Beardmore was far
from the last of the reductions. In 1934, the large Palmers concerns on the Tyne
(Jarrow and Hebburn) and Amble were sold for closure to NSS. These closures later
sparked the (in)famous Jarrow Hunger March as unemployment in Jarrow among the
insured workforce reached 73 per cent.26 In Scotland, unemployment rates for the
insured shipbuilding workforce reached 77 per cent in 1933, dropping to 54 per cent
by 1935.27 Against this background, Warship Group members, who had been operating
as a ring for the best part of a decade, finally decided to reveal their existence, though only
in confidence.28
Into the light: The Royal Commission and its aftermath
When the Warship Group finally admitted its price collusion, it did not reveal it to the
Admiralty. Rather, the admission came in a confidential memorandum advanced by
Charles Craven, chairman of Vickers-Armstrong (he was knighted in 1942), to the
Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms, which began
its investigation in February 1935 and completed it in October 1936. The Royal
Commission had been convened under pressure from millions of peace activists who
signed a mass petition to investigate the links between private profit in weapons manu-
facture and the fomentation of war, against a backdrop of rising Nazism, Fascism and
a global lean towards autarky.
Vickers, as the Commission found, had already participated in profiteering and high-
lighted its relationship with the Electric Boat Company of Groton, Connecticut. This was
based on an agreement to regulate the use of Electric Boat patents in submarine construc-
tion, which provided for payment of 40 per cent of profits from submarines built by
Vickers at Barrow-in-Furness to the American firm. Unsurprisingly, this led to allegations
of price manipulation, which were difficult to explain away, but remained unproven. The
Commission, though deciding that the abolition of private manufacture of arms and the
substitution of a state monopoly was perhaps practicable, was nevertheless, undesirable.
This was at least in part due to the continuing darkening geopolitical landscape, which
somewhat ironically had convinced much of the same public that speedy rearmament
rather than uni- or multi-lateral disarmament was needed. Government, which had no
26. E. Wilkinson, The Town that was Murdered: The Life Story of Jarrow (London, 1939), 146.
27. The Labour Gazette, 1933–1935, various unemployment tables.
28. Johnman and Murphy, ‘Welding and the Shipbuilding Industry’, 101. SBA, GD319 12/1/6,
Memo from Captain T. E. Crease, Acting Chairman Shipbuilding Conference and
Representative of the Warship Group, 18 July 1940.
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real appetite for the Commission in the first place, gratefully accepted the Commission’s
conclusions.29
Why the Warship Group should want to reveal its existence to a Commission notion-
ally set up to look for wrongdoing in private industry’s armaments deals, is unclear. This
is partly due to the paucity of records; aside from Craven’s memo, and some opaque state-
ments made by the Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey during deliberations, little else sur-
vives. Likely, it was motivated not by guilt but by a desire to forestall a full-scale
investigation into the activities of the Warship Group and its individual members. The
embarrassing, but strategically useful, disclosure of Vickers relationship with Electric
Boat by Craven was a case in point. The Warship Group’s memorandum contained an
admission that it had regulated both the distribution of warships and prices, and in an
appendix, it explained the reasons for its formation, as well as that of the NSS, providing
evidence that the two were – by 1935 at least – linked.
Despite the belated admission, neither direct reference nor adverse comment on the
memorandum was included in the body of the Royal Commission’s report, and its appen-
dix was unpublished. Presumably, senior figures in government or in the Civil Service
would have been informed of the Warship Group’s admission to the Commission, and
therefore the Admiralty would have been accordingly informed. Yet, even this is
unclear. What evidence remains suggests that the Admiralty did know of the Group’s
existence consequent to the Commission’s Report as its representatives thereafter met
with the Group regularly. Nonetheless, by and large, they remained unaware or at least
ignorant of the extent of the Warship Group’s collusion on prices and distribution of
orders. It would be quite wrong, however, to think of the Admiralty in monolithic
terms here. It is exceedingly unlikely, for example, that elements within the Admiralty,
including those in closest contact with shipyards (such as the Royal Corps of Naval
Constructors), were blissfully and even shockingly unaware of what was going on.
However, there is little doubt – and on one or two occasions even hinted at in
Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) memoranda of firms ‘operating rings’ – that
there were at least strong suspicions that collusion on prices was ongoing. This said,
chronology is important, for such memos and hints only gathered pace from 1937 as
the Second World War approached, and only really gained momentum from 1940
onwards.30
Another motive for disclosure is that the Warship Group firms, with their principals
holding close and direct links to the Admiralty, and through company Board members
who had previously held senior positions in the Royal Navy, had anticipated that a
bonanza of full order books and profits was imminent as Britain belatedly rearmed,
though rearmament was only scheduled to begin in earnest upon the expiry of the
29. Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms, 1935–1936, Report,
Cmd 5292, (London, 1936), 58, and Chapter 12, para, 3. Statement relating to the Report of
the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms, Cmd 5451
(London, 1937). L. Johnman and H. Murphy, Scott Lithgow, Déjà vu All over Again: The
Rise and Fall of a Shipbuilding Company (Liverpool, 2005), 22.
30. TNA, CAB 102/281, William Hornby, Shipbuilding and Admiralty Production-Preliminary
Draft.
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Washington and London Naval Treaty limits in December 1936. Though these plans had
by necessity to be kept secret, not only from potential enemies, but also to avoid what
would now be termed ‘insider information’ leaking to potential suppliers, and thus invit-
ing share price speculation, it is clear some firms had something of a head start on the rest.
Although the Principal Supply Officers Committee (PSOC), the organ of the CID respon-
sible for supply planning through the rearmament phase, undertook deliberations in con-
ditions of great secrecy, some information found its way to industry months before
rearmament became ‘public’ knowledge, in particular the work on ‘shadow factories’,
intended to boost armament production in the event of war by pulling in new suppliers
from outside the traditional group of military contractors.31
Pertaining to PSOC, three civilian members who had served the country during the First
WorldWar in senior positions in government, served on an Advisory Panel of Industrialists
from October 1933: Sir James Lithgow, Lord Weir of the Cathcart, Glasgow-based engi-
neers, G & J Weir and the Sheffield steel maker, Sir Arthur Balfour.32 Of the three, Weir
was convinced from the outset that munitions (a critical bottleneck in 1915) were crucial,
and that a small group of firms should be selected in peacetime; moreover, he recom-
mended that ‘approaches should only be made to the big firms and the big men’. Weir,
Lithgow and Balfour evidently belonged to that category.33
This attempt to preserve capacity, not simply in the conventional matter of shells and
ammunition, can be seen through Lithgow’s later purchase of the Warship Group
member, Fairfield, in 1935. During the initial phase of NSS liquidations, the Governor
of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman had felt the company was too important to
liquidate and had conceived attempts to ensure its survival, at least in the short term.
Fairfield was, prior to the sale to Lithgow, registered in London as a result of its
earlier takeover by the ill-starred Sperling Combine controlled speculative venture, the
Northumberland Shipbuilding Co. Ltd of Howden on Tyne.34
The Bank of England through its Securities Management Trust had offered £200,000
to keep Fairfield in business, on the proviso that NSS would buy the firm at a later stage if
Fairfield defaulted on the loan.35 NSS had earlier ‘sterilised’ Fairfield’s West yard in
31. Miller, Planning and Profits, 110–3.
32. Lithgow served as Director of Merchant Construction at the Admiralty from 1917 on his
return from active service in France. Weir was Director of Munitions (Scotland) in Lloyd
George’s Ministry of Munitions, and Balfour served on the Advisory Committee on War
Munitions and the Industry Advisory Committee to the Treasury.
33. SBA, DC35/31 CID, PSOC, Co-operation with Industry, note of a meeting on 3 December
1933, cited in Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, 58–9.
34. For Northumberland, see S. Diaper, ‘The Sperling Combine and the Shipbuilding Industry:
Merchant Banking and Industrial Finance in the 1920s’, in J. J. van Helten and Y. Cassis,
eds., Capitalism in a Mature Economy: Financial Institutions, Capital Exports and British
Industry, 1870-1939 (Aldershot, 1990), 71–94; and H. Murphy, ‘An Anatomy of
Speculative Failure: William Doxford & Sons Ltd, Sunderland and the Northumberland
Shipbuilding Company of Howdon on Tyne, 1919-1945’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 104
(2018), 58–72.
35. London, Bank of England Archive, SMT/3/282, Memo from Montagu Norman to Andrew
Duncan, 9 June 1933.
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March 1934, through restrictive covenants barring any return to shipbuilding in that yard.
In all this, through his involvement in advising rearmament planning in the CID, it
remains speculative as to whether Lithgow saved Fairfield for his shipbuilding empire
in the full knowledge that rearmament was imminent. In any event, instead of NSS fol-
lowing through with plans to sterilise the entire company after the eventual default in
1935, Lithgow stepped in as owner and chairman. By this point, however, rearmament
was not exactly on the horizon for all to see, but a White Paper on Defence had been pub-
lished in March 1935, which finally announced the National Government’s decision to
increase defence spending, and the first step to reverse a trend stemming back to the
1920s.36
Rearmament, war and reining in profits
Rearmament, unsurprisingly, proved highly profitable for Warship Group firms, particu-
larly on the Clyde, which had the largest concentration of composite firms.37 The onset of
war saved the bulk of the shipbuilding industry, particularly the mercantile-only firms.
From January 1940, with warship building having priority, as in the Great War, ship-
builders were at the heart of Admiralty organisation of war production.38 Sir James
Lithgow was appointed Controller of Merchant Shipbuilding and Repair on the
proviso that the Admiralty would interfere as little as possible in the normal methods
of carrying on the industry and treat it with maximum goodwill.39 Lithgow had quite a
job on his hands - some of it his own making - particularly on the mercantile side of
the industry, which had been denuded of investment during the interwar period and
lost one-third of its capacity during his tenure as chairman of NSS.
For both the Admiralty and the shipbuilders, it was better to deal with the devil they
knew, rather than the nascent Ministry of Shipping, but as war progressed parliamentary
scrutiny over the Admiralty increased as the published accounts of some shipbuilding
firms showed high profits. We know much of what transpired through a Public
Accounts Committee (PAC) investigation of 1943 into the Navy Appropriation
Account, which questioned the Admiralty’s lack of scrutiny on warship contracts with
36. Statement Relating to Defence, March 1935, Cmd. 4827 (London, 1935).
37. Johnman and Murphy, Scott Lithgow, 23–4. Taking one Warship Group member as an
example, Scott’s Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd., of Greenock, a medium size
private limited liability firm, which did not have to publish its accounts – on the back of
two destroyer and one cruiser contract in 1934–1935 the firm declared a dividend for the
first time since 1926. At the year-end 31 December 1939, due to naval contracts, a total of
£455,000 had been added to the firm’s reserves. Peebles, Warshipbuilding on the Clyde,
151. All mixed builders on Clydeside returned to profit by 1939.
38. TNA, CAB 102/527, D. McKenna, Naval Construction Programmes and their execution,
1935–1945.
39. Johnman and Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State, 60–1. Lithgow’s deputy was Amos
Ayre of the Burntisland Shipbuilding Company, Fife, while Lawrie Edwards of Middle
Docks, Tyneside, whose father George held a similar position in the Great War, was respon-
sible for Ship Repair.
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private shipbuilders, with the Director of Naval Construction (DNC), Sir Stanley
Goodall, being heavily criticised.
The Admiralty, in times when competitive tendering prevailed, sought from its tech-
nical branches a certificate that tender prices were ‘fair and reasonable’, but such certifi-
cates were based on State-owned and managed Royal Dockyard comparisons.40 The
Admiralty’s technical branches continued to arrange fixed prices with this flawed meth-
odology, which was applied to a Group whose members did not compete with one
another before the outbreak of war. In tandem with published profits, the close nature
of price tenders made by Warship Group firms for hull and machinery contracts raised
further suspicions of collusion. For example, for the King George V class of battleships,
of which five were completed by different Warship Group member firms,41 single tenders
(hull and machinery only) for the first two contracts differed by only £6,000 against a
contract price of over £3,500,000, while the lowest tender for those of the subsequent
1937 programme was only £13,000 above the higher of these. Similarly, for Dido
class cruisers of the 1938 programme, nine tenders covered a range of only £18,475.
As Ashworth noted, as a result of this the Admiralty now acted on the assumption that
there was direct price collusion.42
Very little was done about this state of affairs until well after war on Germany was
declared. In the same way that the Royal Commission’s findings were summarily
ignored in October 1936, partly if not wholly due to the alarming state of European inter-
national relations by that point, the inertia in 1937–1938 reflected the pressing issues
already facing British naval rearmament, with a shortage of skilled labour, gun-mounting
pits, armour production and other bottlenecks that necessitated refurbishment and expan-
sion of yards, causing delays to anticipated timescales. Additionally, the increase in dis-
putes over pay and conditions among the available pool of skilled labour was a constant
source of fear within the PSOC.43
The outcomes of the first two challenges to the Warship Group by the Admiralty were
different. In the former, the first measure was to proceed by single tender in ordering war-
ships when the Admiralty required that ships be completed early for operational reasons,
and to check by new methods if tender prices were reasonable. Regarding the second
challenge, in 1940 a scheme was proposed by the Admiralty to determine the actual
costs of private shipbuilders as a guide to fix subsequent prices. By May, however,
40. TNA, CAB 102/542, J. M. Embery, Shipyards and Shipbuilding including Royal Dockyards.
41. HMS King George V (Vickers-Armstrong, Tyne), October 1940. HMS Prince of Wales
(Cammell Laird, Birkenhead), January 1941. HMS Duke of York (John Brown,
Clydebank), August 1941. HMS Anson (Swan Hunter and Wigham Richardson,
Wallsend), April 1942, and HMS Howe (Fairfield, Govan), June 1942. TNA, 102/536,
L. Errington, Naval New Construction Requirements, September 1939–December 1941,
Final Draft.
42. Ashworth, Contracts and Finance (London, 1953), 106–7.
43. C. W. Miller, ‘Forward to Obscurity? Another Dimension to the Decline of the Radical Left
on 1930s Clydeside’, Scottish Labour History, 47 (2012), 91–109. Cambridge, Churchill
College Archives, Records of Lord Weir of Eastwood, Box 17, 20th Meeting of
Sub-committee on Defence Policy and Requirements, 7 May 1936.
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this arrangement was deferred until January 1941, in part due to the National Government
implementing a rise in a new Excess Profits Tax (EPT) to 100 per cent. By January 1941,
however, it was considered that EPT was not on its own adequate to divorce close super-
vision of prices. Thus, the Admiralty decided to approve an earlier proposal to post-cost
typical warships, but not to amend previously agreed prices, and to find details of actual
costs to fix subsequent prices.44
Predictably, any investigation into their true costs alarmed the Group, which expressed
to the Admiralty their strong disapproval. Consequently, after some movement in Group
settlements, some 22 firms agreed to an investigation covering 32 warships with a com-
bined value of over £20m. Of these, 27 had been ordered between 1936 and 1939 and the
remainder placed shortly afterwards. In the later PAC investigation, the true extent of
excessive profit rates was eventually brought to light, including profit rates for submar-
ines of over 70 per cent, and 42 per cent for a battleship. For the 32 orders, the median
profit rate stood at 28 per cent. On a sample of 21 warship contracts for hull and machin-
ery, 14 had profit rates over 30 per cent and of that number, five were over 50 per cent,
one of which was over 80 per cent.45 These profit rates prompted a PAC member to caus-
tically note that the DNC, Sir Stanley Goodall, had been wiped out as an expert on cost-
ings, to which Sir Stanley replied: ‘Only in the matter of submarines.’46
In his diary, Goodall wrote in an entry of 28 October 1943: ‘Public Accts report out.
I get in the neck.’47 Goodall, to his credit, expected criticism. At an earlier session of the
PAC on 9 June, he got ‘badly mauled’ on submarines and on the King George V battle-
ship contracts and knew that he was vulnerable over submarines. The Labour Party
Member of Parliament for Chesterfield, George Benson (who had been imprisoned as
a conscientious objector in the Great War), put some 130 searching questions to
Goodall, who ‘got in no counter attack against Benson and unsurprisingly came away
from the session depressed’.48 On submarines, for example, Warship Group members
such as Vickers-Armstrong could discover Royal Dockyard prices published in the
annual Navy Estimates to Parliament and pitch their tenders accordingly lower and
still make a huge profit over their costs. Moreover, unlike private shipbuilders, the
Royal Dockyards did not charge a profit margin as they were state owned.
Faced with this weight of evidence the warship firms could not but agree that they had
made excess profits and offered to waive claims for ‘extras’ on all warships ordered from
January 1939. They failed to persuade the Admiralty to accept their own figures,
44. Ashworth, Contracts and Finance, 107–8. TNA, CAB 102/203, J. L. Thorne, Admiralty
Contracts, 1945.
45. BPP, PAC Report 1943, para, 12.
46. BPP, PAC Minutes of Evidence, Navy Appropriation Account, 9 June 1943, 4066.
47. I. Buxton, ‘Some Snippets from Sir Stanley Goodall’s Diary, 1943, 1944, 1945’, Warships,
200 (2020), 23. British Library Manuscripts Division, Sir Stanley Goodall Papers, Add. Mss.
527859, Diary 1943. The DNC’s official chronological correspondence and reports are held in
TNA, ADM 229.
48. Buxton, ‘Some Snippets, Goodall’s Diary, 1943’, 20. PAC, Minutes of Evidence Navy
Appropriation Account, 9 June 1943.
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eventually agreeing to waive claims amounting to £2.25m on 169 warships, including
three aircraft carriers, three battleships, 14 cruisers, 40 destroyers and 41 submarines.49
After 1941, fixed prices for warships were abandoned. The Admiralty no longer
requested tenders but paid shipbuilders their costs (confirmed by Admiralty accountants)
plus a profit margin, and for two years prices were settled only for the smaller warships
built. During the 1941 costs investigation it transpired that tenders included a hidden
amount to cover the costs of a 1939 levy payable to the Shipbuilding Conference by
its member firms, including the Warship Group, which replaced three earlier levies sup-
posedly to increase efficiency and to provide modest funding to aid the industry against
foreign competition.50 The levy was applicable to all contracts. With this knowledge the
Admiralty claimed the right to a refund on all future State contracts, warship and mer-
chant, and near the end of 1945 the Shipbuilding Conference, in final settlement paid
the Admiralty £365,000 for the period 1941–1944.51
The nature of the relationship between the Admiralty and the Warship Group
changed from 1941, and some semblance of scrutiny returned for costs tendered in
warship contracts. From this point, the Admiralty placed greater reliance on actual
costs based on as recent a date as possible provided through the Shipbuilding
Conference and preferred group settlements for classes of warships rather that separate
agreements with individual firms. Average costs per ship of the same class were calcu-
lated across the group. A rate of profit around 7.5 per cent was negotiated with builders
and added to the average cost paid for each ship in the group. Prior to the war, the
Admiralty had no official access to shipbuilders’ books, but assumed such powers
from 1939 to get a better idea on costs. If investigations showed estimates on the
cost of completion were too high the firm in question had to refund the excess, and
if too low (however unlikely this may be) had to simply bear the loss. In addition,
and for the first time, the Group was mandated to supply an overall profit certificate
outlining the profit made on each settlement as a whole.52
Though increasing profits had attracted greater scrutiny from 1941, the Admiralty
could draw few comparisons in warships with Royal Dockyard costs as a yardstick
to confirm whether contracts were fair and reasonable (though escalating private
costs against even the rough comparator of Dockyard overheads told a significant
part of the story). The Admiralty, further, overestimated the anticipated cost increases
between contract signing and eventual delivery some years later, which were often
reflected in the tender price, and the overhead rates of shipbuilders that had reduced
49. Ashworth, Contracts and Finance, 109.
50. On foreign competition, the levy made little difference as the Shipbuilding Conference con-
fidentially admitted to the Board of Trade in 1938 that the industry could no longer compete
with continental competition for reasons including high cost levels. H. Murphy, ‘No Longer
Competitive with Continental Shipbuilders: British Shipbuilding and International
Competition, 1930–1960’, International Journal of Maritime History, 25 (2013), 44.
51. Ashworth, Contracts and Finance, 112.
52. For a fuller discussion of the period 1941 to 1945 and commentary on contract negotiations
making full use of PAC and Comptroller and Auditor General reports, see Ashworth,
Contracts and Finance, 108–13.
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per ship-built owing to full order books as rearmament progressed. The net result was
to keep the illusion, largely through poor calculation on the part of the Admiralty, of
‘reasonable’ tenders, for progressively lower actual costs as overheads were fully uti-
lised and labour was scarcely idle and thus profits grew even after 1941 as there was
obviously a long time-lag in agreeing contract settlements for warships began years
before. As the PAC Report’s authors concluded, knowledge of the Admiralty’s tech-
nical departments of shipbuilding costs in the private yards had proven to be
‘gravely inadequate’.53
Conclusions
How, why and when private firms formed a ring in order to fix prices and how this ring
worked influenced warship procurement practice for the Royal Navy. Though initially
informal, the backdrop of the mid-1920s and the paucity of other assistance drove
firms together and therefore undermined substantially any process of competition
between firms, even when stability and profits returned and when faux rationalisation
had ended. Though undoubtedly crucial in preventing cutthroat competition, serving
(whether knowingly or otherwise) the Admiralty’s and the Warship Group’s interest at
the time it continued for at least a decade than was necessary or defensible.
The second explanation regards the process, or lack thereof, of oversight by the
Admiralty of its longstanding partners in warship construction. It might seem incredible
that subsequent to the confidential memorandum sent to the Royal Commission in 1935–
1936 the Admiralty, the department of state responsible for the shipbuilding industry,
would continue to be unaware that the Warship Group existed as a price fixing cartel.
And yet, the evidence of ever-increasing profits and only belated oversight to bring
these under control, is clear. Nonetheless, the Admiralty did become increasingly suspi-
cious that a ring existed, especially given that there was remarkably little difference in
tender prices during competitive tendering exercises, particularly as rearmament took
hold from 1936 to the early phase of the Second World War. However, the Admiralty
was remarkably content to satisfy itself that comparing warship firms’ prices with
Royal Dockyard costs provided a reasonable point of comparison and thus offered pro-
tection against excessive profiteering from the former. This rationale was deeply flawed
and given the excessive rates of profit made by warship firms, could be seen as a derelic-
tion of fiduciary duty to taxpayers.
There probably also was an element of wilful ignorance, especially given the desir-
ability, at least in the late 1920s and early 1930s, of retaining a core of warship firms
in business as a hedge against future rearmament. The NSS liquidations had shown,
after all, that while there was (usually) dozens if not hundreds of idle berths free in the
late 1920s and early 1930s, the role of warship builders with specialist facilities for
complex naval orders provided a special case requiring special attention, particularly
from 1933 as international tensions flared. It was, however, highly convenient for the sur-
viving Warship Group firms that NSS helped to remove competition by reducing the total
number of shipyards specialising in warship construction, leaving the remaining firms in
53. Buxton, ‘Some Snippets, Goodall’s Diary, 1943’, 33.
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a far better position to financially exploit rearmament as it took hold. A combination of
fewer facilities and national exigency combined to trump more detailed scrutiny of
tenders, and to lead planners to conclude that given the pressing nature of the challenges
faced, the quicker Britain re-armed, and the fewer barriers erected, the better.54
Indeed, the Warship Group knowingly acted as a ring to boost its profits at the expense
of the taxpayer. No criminal sanctions under common law or existing regulations materi-
alised, though the Group operated in what could only be described as a lax anti-trust
environment. It was only in 1948, however, that Attlee’s Labour Government introduced
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, which established a
Monopolies Commission. However, nationalised undertakings and trade unions were
exempt.55
When the evidence mounted against the Warship Group, exemplified in the PAC
Report of 1943, some financial redress to taxpayers accrued, but profits had already
been disbursed to shareholders through dividends, which were particularly high in the
publicly quoted firms that had many institutional shareholders in the City of London.
In a sense, everyone but the general taxpaying public, who would expect their govern-
ments and departments of state to look after their collective interests, benefitted. The
Warship Group survived, later made excessive profits, the Admiralty obtained their war-
ships, private investors and city institutions banked their dividends, and Britain and its
allies won the war.
As the war ended, the outlook for warship firms was once again gloomy as the naval
new construction programme for 1945 was reduced to an absolute minimum consisting
only of two escort vessels, one submarine, two surveying ships, six small floating docks
and some miscellaneous small craft. Only one battleship, Vanguard, was laid down at
John Brown Clydebank on 8 October 1941, and what would become the last battleship
built for the Royal Navy was nearing completion.56 Her long build time was largely
due to shortages of skilled labour, and she was finally commissioned on 12 May 1946.
By VE Day, 727 vessels had been cancelled from fleet carriers downwards, whose
total costs had they been completed, was estimated at £158 million, of which £32.5
million was already spent or was a liability under break clause conditions, giving a net
saving of £125.5 million.57
The larger mixed firms could now switch their endeavours to cost-plus mercantile con-
struction in the temporary absence of two pre-war competitors, Germany and Japan. By
the first quarter of 1947, the volume of tonnage in hand was the largest since 1922 in the
easy conditions of a sellers’ market for the British shipbuilding industry, which lasted to
1958. For the Warship Group of firms, however, in an atomic age, the years of plenty in
naval construction soon turned to famine, and the nascent air travel industry after 1960
fatally undermined any hopes that passenger liners would make up the shortfall in the
54. R. A. C. Parker, ‘British Rearmament 1936–1939: Treasury, Trade Unions and Skilled
Labour’, The English Historical Review, 96 (1981), 306–43.
55. 11 & 12 Geo VI, 1948.
56. House of Commons Debates, vol. 420, 7 March 1946, Navy Estimates, Statement by the First
Lord of the Admiralty, A.V. Alexander (hereafter HC Debates Navy Estimates), cols. 544–5.
57. HC Debates Navy Estimates, col. 544.
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longer term. By the end of the 1940s, the long and irreversible process towards funda-
mental rationalisation of the warship sector of the British shipbuilding industry was
underway.58
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